Housing Subsidies and Work Incentives by Shroder, Mark
Housing Subsidies and Work Incentives*
1 




Low-income housing assistance is part of the welfare state of all developed countries. 
The rest of the welfare state may cause work disincentives. In theory, housing 
assistance may also do so, but those disincentives may be blunted by its in-kind 
character and the way it is rationed. Rationing and selection make the estimation 
difficult; the most rigorous evidence from the United States suggests a loss of 10 to 20 
cents in earnings per dollar of assistance. Less rigorous evidence from Australia 
suggests negative impacts in public housing but not housing benefit, while in 




In all developed countries, housing assistance is a part of the larger structure of the 
welfare state, some parts of which reduce labor supply. In this article we discuss 
whether housing assistance does so as well. Arthur Okun introduced the metaphor of 
the leaky bucket to describe the common situation in which a dollar taken from the rich 
delivers less than a dollar’s worth of benefit to the poor. One of Okun’s four basic leaks 
is from changes in work effort induced by redistribution. Gary Burtless, reviewing a 
series of negative income tax (NIT) experiments, found that the implementation of the 
NIT in the United States would have caused the government to spend almost $2 in 
order to increase family incomes by $1, mostly due to higher transfers inducing 
reductions in labor supply among the assisted. 
 
Fair assessment of program effects is difficult.  Housing assistance programs usually 
target the most disadvantaged families in society. They were selected for assistance 
because they needed help. It is easy to confuse the effect of the selection with the effect 
of the program.  We first consider what economic theory predicts, then the 
methodological barriers to investigation, and finally the evidence relating to labor supply 
consequences of housing assistance programs.  
 
Theory: A Neoclassical Hypothesis  
In general, a housing assistance program fills the gap between the cost of decent 
housing and the amount the state expects a low-income household to contribute to its 
own shelter. In general, the amount of assistance is the higher of zero or 
 
A = G –T(Y)        (1) 
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Susan Smith and published by Elsevier.  It is posted on October 15, 2010.  Disclaimer: Opinions 
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and Urban Development. 
 where G is the amount the state will pay for a household with no income at all, Y is the 
household’s actual income, and T(Y) is the contribution function, which usually 
depends on Y. 
 
The government typically sets G in response to housing market conditions and family 
circumstances, such as number of members in the household.  The amount by which 
T(Y) rises with a small increase in Y is the tax rate, or taper – the rate at which housing 
subsidies fall as income rises. In the United States, T(Y) is a flat tax, as the tenant is 
expected to pay 30 cents of every dollar of income towards rent. In many countries the 
tax rate is graduated. For example, for UK households with less than a minimum 
income (more or less the basic social welfare payment), the housing program has a tax 
rate of zero, but above that level benefit is withdrawn at the rate of 65 cents for each 
additional pound. The French housing tax is a marvel of complexity, varying between 0 
and 37 cents on the marginal euro according to a five-factor formula. Most developed 
countries list the specific features of their programs in the OECD (2007). 
 
Many economists and not a few non-economists instinctively suspect that housing 
assistance receipt must reduce labor supply. Here we formalize that instinct; let the 
positive predictions that emerge from the following analysis form the ‘neoclassical 
hypothesis’.  Suppose an assisted housing tenant is able to work. Her willingness to sell 
her time to an employer may change because a housing program has both substitution 
and income effects. 
 
The substitution effects are straightforward. If she gets no housing assistance, selling 
an hour of her time will yield her some nominal wage, net of taxes that include the 
benefit taper rates in other programs. If, however, she receives assistance, her net 
wage will be reduced by yet another tax, representing the share of her income that she 
is expected to contribute towards rent. Obviously, this somewhat depresses her 
willingness to sell her leisure time to a potential employer. 
 
Housing assistance also should have income effects. In principle, admission to one of 
the deeply targeted programs guarantees the household the use of a standard quality 
housing unit if the head of household has no income whatever. Even in the absence of 
a marginal tax rate on wages, the housing guarantee might make the client somewhat 
less interested in offering up her free time to the market. 
 
    (Figure 1 about here.) 
 
Figure 1 gives a static view of leisure–goods tradeoffs, with labor supply (‘Hrs’) on the 
X-axis and consumption (‘Good’) on the Y-axis. The individual has a utility function 
representing ‘tastes and preferences’ that govern her choices between consuming more 
market goods and having more free time, or leisure. Joining combinations of leisure and 
goods yielding equal amounts of utility forms indifference curves such as U and U’ in 
Figure 1; when the agent’s budget constraint reflects no housing assistance (‘No HA’), 
her labor supply is A and her utility is U. When housing assistance is introduced (‘HA’), the slope of the budget constraint becomes less steep because the housing 
program tax reduces the net wage, and thus the slope; the guaranteed level of housing 
consumption raises the intercept. The agent’s utility rises to U’, but her labor hours fall 
to B. 
 
      (Figure 2 about here.) 
 
The neoclassical hypothesis, therefore, is that housing assistance programs will 
depress a head of household’s willingness to work in the short run. Although Figure 1 
presents the case of a marginal reduction in hours worked – possibly a case of little 
policy significance – one cannot exclude the possibility that shift in the budget constraint 
would lead some assistance recipients to a corner solution, that is, having no job. This 
case is depicted in Figure 2). 
 
An agent with the utility function depicted would work C hours if unassisted, but zero 
hours if assisted.   
 
No reasonable housing assistance program can readily escape the alleged negative 
consequences. To avoid an income effect one would have to stop helping people 
altogether. A program without a tax or taper on benefits as income grows would assist 
everyone, whether in need or not, and tax everyone to pay for it. Some housing 
programs have no taper up to a certain income Y*, but provide no assistance at all 
above Y*. These programs have not escaped the dilemma, as the tax rate on Y*+ 1 
might be 10,000% or more. 
 
Weaknesses of the Neoclassical Hypothesis 
The neoclassical hypothesis has two major theoretical weaknesses: treatment of 
assistance as an income supplement and neglect of selection effects. 
 
Objection 1: In-kind character of program. We have, up to this point, treated the 
assistance as an income supplement rather than as a commodity subsidy. This is a 
gross oversimplification; the income effect is particularly questionable because true 
housing assistance is not fungible.  Michael Murray demonstrated in 1980 that most 
commodity subsidy programs induce more work effort than equivalent cash transfer 
programs, by stimulating the desire to consume more of the subsidized good with 
additional income. In this view, housing assistance should be modeled as a price cut to 
a particular good. The higher resulting real income might result in greater consumption 
of housing, greater consumption of other goods, and/or greater consumption of leisure. 
The leisure choice is indeterminate without further assumptions about preferences for 
consumption of other goods, which are likely to be heterogeneous. 
 
The heterogeneity of assisted families can be considerable.  Consider four cases: 
1. Housing assistance might enable a parent to move away from a gang-infested area, 
where she need not monitor her teenager as closely. Perhaps that will lead to new 
employment. Or it might cause her to move to a gang area, where it is easier to use her 
assistance. If assistance is only available through residence in a housing project with a gang, it will be not only easier but also necessary. Perhaps that will cause her to quit 
her job. 
 
2. Assistance might permit a parent to move out of the apartment where she has been 
living, doubled up, with her sister’s family. Perhaps the reduction in background chaos 
will make job search easier; perhaps the increased privacy will make her feel more 
comfortable if she stops looking for work. 
 
3. Suppose the head of household is caring for a sick relative, and works only enough to 
pay the rent. With assistance, she might stop working. But perhaps, with the rent mostly 
taken care of, she can get out of charity waiting rooms and into a full-time job. 
 
4. A student recipient who is currently working part-time might be encouraged by 
housing subsidy payments to cut back on work hours so as to attend school full-time. 
Her schooling might or might not lead to full-time employment later on. 
 
In short, so long as housing assistance is not an unconditional cash grant, the effect of 
housing assistance on labor supply, as a matter of either theory or practice, is 
ambiguous. The effect depends on which people are assisted, and how the assistance 
is delivered. 
 
Objection 2: Rationing and selection effects. Housing assistance in many countries is 
not an entitlement, and even where it is theoretically an entitlement, as in Scandinavia, 
many eligible families fail to participate. In the United States, assistance is rationed to 
income-eligible households according to various local criteria by public housing 
authorities and project owners. Selection effects might mitigate any depressing effect on 
earnings and would certainly complicate its estimation. Blackorby and Donaldson first 
analyzed the selection effect of a ‘tagged’ good in 1988. They showed that if the 
government cannot observe potential income, it can help ensure selection of the most 
needy into assistance by providing it in a form that is unappealing to those with higher 
potential income. 
 
Many housing projects are unappealing to those who can afford better units. In the 
United States, housing vouchers are sufficiently unattractive to many landlords that a 
significant fraction of those who receive vouchers never use them; eligible families with 
the highest incomes and lowest prospective subsidies are least likely to use their 
vouchers. Thus, while receipt of assistance may suppress realized income, potential 
income may suppress receipt of assistance. The practical conditions of assistance may 
be such that more able workers leave or never enter the programs.  A high marginal tax 
rate like the 65 percent charged to some tenants in the United Kingdom, for example, 
will on the one hand reduce labor supply from some tenants who remain in the program, 
but will on the other hand push other tenants out of the program more quickly.  The use 
of long waiting lists or onerous admissions procedures as rationing devices would have 
a similar impact. People who were able to adjust to the housing market without 
assistance (e.g., by moving to another jurisdiction, by getting another or better job) 
would tend to screen themselves out of the program. These forms of screening will eliminate the least desperate, who may include those most responsive to the potential 
work disincentives. 
 
Methodological Issues  
Empirical studies in this area might be subject to four different types of bias: bias from 
reporting error, selection bias, simultaneity bias, and general omitted variable bias. 
 
Bias from reporting error. This is potentially fatal to certain types of study. The fact and 
type of housing assistance receipt are widely misreported by respondents, often in 
surprising directions. Researchers have to use survey data on assistance status with 
great caution. For example, in the 1993 American Housing Survey, the population 
equivalent of 2.235 million respondents informed their interviewers that they lived in 
public housing, which is explicitly defined in the survey instrument as units owned by a 
public housing authority. This is almost exactly double the true number. Thus, incorrect 
identification of assistance status is a threat to the validity of any study relying entirely 
on survey data. 
 
Selection bias. Even if assistance status is correctly reported, selection bias may be 
difficult to control, for several reasons. If two households look the same, according to 
the data that we observe, but one has assistance and the other does not, one cannot 
assume that the assistance causes any observed differences in behavior, because the 
difference in selection into the assistance program may be related to other behavioral 
patterns. 
 
First, selection into housing assistance is likely to be highly dependent on locality. Local 
housing markets dictate he degree of competition for scarce assistance resources. 
Program eligibility parameters also differ from one market to another, and local 
administrative preferences and procedures may determine in part which families rise to 
the top in that competition. 
 
Second, many of the world’s housing programs effectively exclude the full-time 
employed, even those with low wages. In programs that weed out workers with strong 
labor force attachment, the choices of the assisted may largely reflect the selection 
regime. Thus, the analyst who starts out arguing, as a normative matter, for treating the 
current clients of a program differently may end up arguing that the program should 
serve different clients altogether. 
 
Simultaneity bias. This is related to selection bias, but inprinciple may be easier to 
control. As noted above, housing assistance may affect labor supply, but, also, 
employment success affects the use of housing assistance. If one wishes to measure 
the former but not the latter, one strategy is not to measure them at the same time. 
Assuming one has the other sources of bias controlled properly, one might model the 
effect of housing assistance receipt in the first period on employment success in the 
second. 
 General omitted variable bias. From a very large literature in labor economics, we know 
that employment varies with participation in other social programs, which have their own 
incentives and disincentives; with a worker’s human capital; with the demands of the 
local labor market; with the individual’s connectedness to social networks; and with sex, 
race, ethnicity, height, accent, personal appearance, motivation, intelligence, and many 
other factors. Failure to control for these factors will generally bias measurement of the 
specific effect of housing assistance. As we saw above, it is improbable that the effects 
of housing assistance on employment are uniform across different types of recipients. 
Omitted variable bias will naturally be lower whenever a richer set of relevant 
explanatory variables is available, but is inescapable in observational data. 
 
Empirical Results: United States  
In 2002 Shroder summarized nearly two dozen studies with a bearing on the effect of 
housing assistance on labor supply in the United States, writing that a rather large 
literature had failed to confirm the neoclassical hypothesis in its purest form, and that 
‘‘the distribution of results from these empirical studies is consistent with a true housing 
assistance/short-term employment effect of zero’’. 
 
That summary is obsolete. Three major reports since 2002 have made it apparent that 
housing assistance in the United States has a net negative impact on labor supply. 
However, that impact appears to vary among subgroups, may change over time, and 
seems rather small relative to the amounts paid out in subsidy. 
 
In 2006 Mills and colleagues reported on a demonstration in which nearly 9000 welfare 
families with children in six distinct locations were randomly assigned either to 
receive housing vouchers or not to receive them, at least initially. In principle, use of 
administrative data and random assignment to treatment group eliminate all of the 
biases noted above. After allowing for the effects of failure by some members of the 
treatment group to actually use their vouchers, and for the tendency of some control 
group members to obtain vouchers with the passage of time, the Mills group reports a 
negative impact on earnings of about $960 per household actually using a voucher 
in the first 18 months after random assignment, but the effect is not statistically 
significant in the following 24 months. During the period covered, the direct cost to the 
government of a voucher to a welfare family for 18 months probably averaged about 
$9000, so the measured loss to earnings is in the neighborhood of 10% of the 
subsidy outlay. 
 
In 2008 Jacob and Ludwig reported on the experience of roughly 42,000 families in 
Chicago, again assigned by lottery either to receive or not receive vouchers. The 
Chicago sample is much more diverse in some ways than the Mills sample, containing 
families who never received welfare or had no children, but the danger of generalization 
from Chicago to the nation is an offsetting limitation. They find a negative earnings 
impact of about $328 per quarter, with negative effects tending, if anything, to increase 
over time. As average subsidy outlays in Chicago in this period were roughly $1700 per 
quarter, this would be consistent with measured loss of earnings in 
the neighborhood of 20% of the subsidy outlay.   Also in 2008, Carlson and coworkers exploited administrative data from the Wisconsin 
welfare and food stamps programs to track the employment experience of nearly 13 000 
self-reported voucher recipients, who applied at least once for either the welfare or food 
stamps programs, and created a comparison group of 30 or so non-recipients for every 
recipient, using the propensity score method. They find a reduction in earnings of $858 
in the first year of voucher receipt, relative to the comparison group, but just $277 in the 
fifth year following first receipt. The former number would be consistent with measured 
loss of earnings in the neighborhood of 15 percent of subsidy outlay. Because most 
families with children do not use the voucher for more than 4 years, the fifth-year 
estimate is consistent with no permanent impacts of the voucher on the career path of 
earnings once a family has relinquished it. 
 
Together, these studies seem to establish that the US voucher program has a negative 
impact on the earnings of assisted families. The ‘leakage from the bucket’ seems to be 
in the range of 10 to 20 percent of subsidy outlays.  Evidence on the growth or 
diminution of this leakage over time is inconsistent. 
 
The best evidence available on the relative impacts of different forms of assistance 
does not indicate any difference between the impact of vouchers and of public housing. 
In 2003 Orr and colleagues reported on the experience of about 4600 tenants of high-
poverty public housing projects in five cities who applied for vouchers in a special 
demonstration and were randomly assigned to regular vouchers, vouchers only usable 
in low-poverty neighborhoods, or to nonvoucher control status.  Roughly 5 years after 
random assignment, there was no significant difference in earnings among the three 
groups. 
 
Empirical Results Elsewhere 
Empirical literature measuring the direct labor supply effects of housing assistance 
outside the United States is scattered and surprisingly sparse. Evidence from social 
experiments like those reviewed above is nonexistent outside the United States. This is 
not the case for other types of social interventions. The author has found significant 
empirical literatures only for Australia and Scandinavia. Work disincentives have been 
discussed elsewhere, but so far as I can tell the effects have not been measured. We 
omit discussion of the very complex results of Bingley and Walker (2001) in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Australia.  Australia combines an entitlement housing allowance program with a 
rationed public housing program.  The cash assistance (income support) programs, 
such as disability pension, unemployment benefit, and so on, are the passports to 
eligibility for the housing allowance program. The housing allowance is withdrawn once 
entitlement to the underlying pension or allowance is zero, and the taper rate is the 
same as that applying to the pension or allowance. This arrangement avoids adding 
to the multiple stacking program, but extends the income range over which high 
effective marginal tax rates can persist. The entitlement program simply adds an additional guarantee to households already receiving cash assistance; the cash 
assistance programs have their own tapers and the entitlement program does not add 
to them. 
 
The extant literature is primarily concerned with labor supply impacts of the public 
housing program, where the basic tax rate is 25%. Hulse and Randolph write that both 
entitlement and public housing program survey respondents are well aware of work 
disincentives in their respective programs, but that only public housing tenants 
considered them serious concerns.  Whelan (2004) finds some evidence that housing 
assistance reduces the likelihood that assisted tenants have any employment (like the 
corner solution in Figure 2) but no evidence that it reduces the choice of 
hours worked (like the marginal case in Figure 1). In his view the programs do not have 
a ‘‘sizeable or substantial impact on labor market activity’’ because receipt is 
conditional on participation in other government programs, which have their own, more 
serious, work disincentive effects. 
 
    (Table 1 about here.) 
 
Scandinavia.  Table 1 is adapted from Nordvik and Ahren (2005). It shows the 
percentage of households receiving housing allowances and the percentage of GDP 
paid out in housing allowances in the four Scandinavian nations in 2002, 
and we have added the United States as a reference point.   
 
Allowances are an entitlement in Scandinavia, but differences among these four 
countries are large.  Finland, for example, gave allowances to one-fifth of its 
population but in doing so redistributed only one part in 800 of its national income. This 
implies a very low guarantee, a very low taper, and therefore a very low impact 
on labor supply; housing problems would need to be widespread but very shallow to 
justify this program.  The other three countries were redistributing about one 
part in 150 of national income, with very different participation rates: 6% in Norway, 21% 
in Denmark, and 36% in Sweden. These figures imply high guarantees in all 
three countries, with a high taper in Norway and lower tapers in the other two. In 
Sweden, for example, the tax rate is graduated but never exceeds 20%. 
 
We have found no analyses of impact on short-term labor supply, but several on the 
related question of longer-term dependence on subsidy. If assistance keeps people out 
of the labor market, absence from the labor market keeps them poor, and poverty keeps 
them in assistance, then we should expect to see duration dependence in the data, that 
is, households would be more likely to stay in assistance if they are already assisted. 
 
To the extent that the neoclassical hypothesis applies anywhere in Scandinavia, it must 
apply with greatest force in Norway, but Nordvik and Ahren reported no evidence of a 
dependency culture in a data set comprising all assistance recipients with children. 
Attrition from the program is high and they find no sign of duration 
dependence.   
 If Norway with its high guarantee and high taper generates no signs of duration 
dependence, it should not be surprising that Sweden with its somewhat lower guarantee 
and relatively low (20%) taper does not either.  Chen (2006) found no indication of 
duration dependence and nothing to indicate that welfare traps should be a 
serious concern for the Swedish housing allowance system. 
 
Conclusion 
Housing subsidies, like other parts of the welfare state, might discourage clients from 
pursuing earned income.  Current literature appears to indicate that the effects of 
housing assistance on contemporaneous labor supply are modestly negative. Findings 
on long-term effects on economic self-sufficiency are not entirely consistent, but 
appear modestly negative at worst and negligible at best.  The modest size and 
heterogeneity of the labor-supply response may cause a lack of robustness in findings 
from studies based on observational data. Controlled experiments outside the United 
States would therefore be highly desirable. 
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   Source: Scandinavian data from Nordvik and Ahren (2005), US from author. 
 
 